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1. Introduction 
‘The better part of valor is discretion’.1 Those who are wise avoid 
unnecessary risks. In legal systems, however, discretion is unavoidable. 
Law is plagued, as catalogued by the American critical legal studies 
movement, with indeterminacy.2 It is left to judges to fill the gaps 
produced by technological change, legislative ambiguity, and diverse 
factual circumstances. What is interesting, therefore, is not whether legal 
systems produce discretion—all of them do—but how discretion is 
controlled. By answering that question, a whole host of further 
questions; about the role of judges in our societies, about their 
techniques of interpretation, and about the accountability of our legal 
and political systems; are revealed. Through analysing the management 
of discretion we reveal some of the fundamental components of legal 
orders. 
This chapter focuses on the control of discretion in one particular system 
of rules: EU economic governance. By focusing on the EU, and on the 
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economic example, two further potential amplifiers of discretion are 
introduced. On top of the inevitable indeterminacy of all legal texts, EU 
legal sources are complicated by the multi-level nature of the EU legal 
order. Many EU legal sources are of a particularly vague and contested 
character, from the abstract norms of EU primary law to the confusing 
and potentially contradictory rules of secondary law (the product of 
compromises and competing views between 28 Member States). As also 
outlined in other chapters in this volume, EU policy making is a highly 
discretionary space. In EU economic governance, the intersection of 
different social systems must be added to that mix. Norms in economic 
governance attempt to regulate a field—the EU economy—that is 
governed largely via economic concepts and mechanisms, which are not 
easily reducible to legal categories. Economic governance expands the EU 
discretionary space even further. 
To this extent, there seems little point in writing an analysis evidencing 
the prevalence of discretion in the application of the rules of EU 
economic governance. The evidence—discussed briefly in Section 2—is 
indisputable.3 While authors may disagree on the extent of freedom that 
policy makers in the economic field enjoy, few would contest the idea 
that the control of economic decision makers is a perilous and difficult 
task. 
This chapter’s purpose is therefore a different one. Assuming that the 
basic rules of EU economic governance provide policy makers with an 
extremely large margin of manoeuvre, what kind of strategies can the 
European judiciary, and other actors such as the EU’s political 
institutions, use to control discretion? How can they ensure adherence to 
a basic level of legal accountability, i.e. faithfulness to the overall ‘rules of 
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the game’ in the economic field? The chapter therefore aims to be 
inductive, exploratory, and forward looking. Rather than critique a 
particular judicial approach to the control of economic policy making over 
others, its purpose is to categorize and lay out different methodologies to 
control discretion in the economic field. The rationale, advantages, and 
disadvantages of each approach will be examined as openly as possible. It 
is ultimately for judges and policy makers to determine which of these 
approaches to choose. 
Having discussed the main causes and challenges of economic discretion 
in Section 2, the chapter then examines four strategies for the control of 
discretion. Section 3 discusses strategies of deference; functional 
varieties of what in the human rights field is termed a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in policy making. Section 4 discusses prescription, i.e. the 
idea of containing discretion through the production, via soft law or other 
instruments, of more detailed rules to prescribe economic conduct. 
Section 5 covers proceduralism, i.e. subjecting economic decision makers 
to forms of process-based and political accountability. Finally, Section 6 
discusses interdisciplinary justification—the use by judicial actors in 
particular of (economic) knowledge as a means of limiting the space for 
discretionary action. The chapter concludes by analysing the political and 
constitutional values that underpin each of these strategies. As argued 
there, the choice of one strategy over another is likely to reflect back on 
the weight particular actors give to one value over another. 
2. Discretion in EU Economic Governance 
From where does discretion in EU economic governance emerge? While 
this is a complex question that could be approached from many angles, 
much of the answer derives from the complexity and dynamism of the 
economic system that EU economic governance attempts to regulate. 
Part of the core vocabulary of European Monetary Union (EMU) is the 
extent to which it ought to be ‘rules-based’. In this debate, the German 
finance minister has been a particularly stout advocate of strict rule 
  
following in banking and fiscal regulation.4 This, however, is a peculiar 
form of rule following. The rules to be adhered to are not universal and 
abstract rules of conduct, but often quantitative, state-specific targets, 
the fulfilment of which depends on meeting particular economic 
criteria.5 These criteria are themselves contested between actors and 
depend on fluctuating economic cycles. As such, the idea of a ‘rules-
based’ EMU is rather misleading. For most of the EMU’s rules, there is no 
‘automaticity’ that easily connects a state’s fiscal performance with a 
clear outcome. Instead, we have a complex system of decision making 
and evaluation. 
This can be illustrated through the commonly cited example of the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP). While the secondary legislation 
governing this procedure seems to carry relatively clear quantitative 
boundaries—for example, the 3 per cent deficit target, or the setting of 
Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MBTOs) for states—this certainty is 
illusory. The terms of the applicable legislation, for good reasons, do not 
specify in precise detail what does or does not ‘count’ for the purposes of 
calculating deficits. Where they do—for example, via the definition of a 
‘structural deficit’—they rely on economic concepts with unclear 
boundaries.6 Which items of expenditure, then, should count as 
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‘structural’ and which are fluctuations or one-off investments that can be 
expected as part of the economic cycle?7 The same difficulty applies to 
the question of whether states are making adequate progress towards 
MBTOs in the context of the EDP’s corrective arm. The legal framework 
allows the Commission to take into account a number of vague factors in 
determining ‘progress’ towards MTBOs, from whether a state is 
implementing ‘major structural reforms’8 to whether ‘temporary 
measures’ apply. What do these terms mean? 
As Damian Chalmers has argued, these provisions seem less like rules 
than ‘decisions’: norms which are of a sufficiently vague character to 
allow the actor executing them unfettered discretion in determining how 
they might be applied to a concrete case.9 They also rely on a complex 
determination of effects, e.g. of whether a particular structural reform 
really is ‘major’, and if so, whether it will have a positive budgetary effect. 
In this sense, while the ‘Six-Pack’ and ‘Two-Pack’ regulations were 
heralded as ‘tightening’ fiscal regulation, they had little option but to 
create a significant discretionary decision-making space into which a 
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diverse array of Eurozone economies, and a highly fluctuating economic 
environment, could fit. For judicial actors, this discretionary space creates 
a real quandary. If the rules of the EDP, like other rules of economic 
governance, are open, nested in economic concepts, and reliant on 
uncertain future effects, how can judges ensure that economic decision 
makers (in the EDP case, the Commission) have exercised their functions 
faithfully?10 Law seems to be playing catch-up with an economic and 
fiscal decision-making system able to easily evade its control. 
3. Strategy 1: Deference 
One answer to the quandary is not to play the game of ‘catch-up’ at all. 
Typically, when reviewing the actions of the EU institutions when 
engaging in policy making, and particularly when making complex 
technical assessments, the CJEU has adopted a highly deferential 
approach. This often involves checking merely whether a ‘manifest error 
of assessment’ or ‘abuse of power’ can be observed.11 As Joana Mendes 
argues, a more expansive understanding of the CJEU’s approach in cases 
involving the supervision of executive discretion would involve anchoring 
judicial review in a (thin) conception of the public interest.12 When 
making decisions of an economic nature, the Commission carries a duty 
of care to examine all of the relevant facts impartially, to accurately state 
those facts and to base their decisions on ‘the fullest information 
possible’.13 The EU executive is thus provided with a broad margin of 
discretion, provided that it can demonstrate that it had adhered to 
principles of sound administration—based on accurate information and 
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orientated towards the public interest. Once this basic threshold of 
reasonable conduct has been met, the Courts are prepared to give the 
institutions the benefit of constitutional doubt. 
It is not challenging to read recent case-law in the field of economic 
governance in this light. In the infamous Gauweiler judgment, the CJEU’s 
response to a reference by the German Constitutional Court allowed the 
ECB a high margin of discretion.14 This allowance concerned two aspects 
of the judgment—firstly, the determination of whether the OMT 
programme of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) had lain 
within the ECB’s monetary and price stability mandate, and secondly, the 
proportionality of the programme. The Gauweiler judgment illustrates 
starkly some of the difficulties of adjudicating economic governance 
discussed in Section 2. Assessing whether OMT lay within the price 
stability mandate required a close analysis both of the purpose of the 
OMT programme and its likely effects.15 For the CJEU, the purpose of 
OMT was to ensure the smooth functioning of the Monetary 
Transmission mechanism, i.e. the ability of central interest rate setting to 
filter into the wider economy, and into pricing and lending practices in 
particular.16 Addressing whether or not the OMT programme was 
necessary to ensure the proper functioning of this mechanism is clearly 
an empirical question. Was the ECB’s argument—that widening bond 
yields between EU states and economic uncertainty was acting as a 
decisive hindrance to the ability of monetary policy to be effective—
convincing and observable? 
This speaks to the most powerful argument for favouring deference as an 
approach to dealing with economic discretion. Clearly, empirical 
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questions require empirical answers. For all the qualities of the CJEU 
Justices, they are not economists and are unlikely to carry as 
sophisticated an understanding of the transmission mechanism as the 
institution entrusted with this task under the EU Treaties.17 The CJEU 
therefore—in answer to the question of whether OMT was within the 
ECB’s mandate—largely takes the ECB at its word, accepting the 
objectives and justification of the programme given by the ECB itself. In 
its proportionality review, the Court follows many of the traditional steps 
mentioned here, arguing that the OMT programme requires the making 
of complex technical assessments for which the ECB and ESCB are 
themselves competent, thus demanding a broad margin of discretion.18 
As there was no obvious error of assessment, as there was evidence that 
evidence-based, reasoned decisions had been given, and as limitations on 
the programme’s scope had been made, the ECB’s programme was 
consistent with Treaty rules.19 Deference in this sense could be seen as a 
tool to preserve institutional balance, and the proper demarcation of 
institutional functions in the EU constitutional order.20 A court that went 
beyond the limited thresholds demanded in Gauweiler could lay accused 
of over-stepping its constitutional mandate to apply rules of law, rather 
than to second-guess the judgments of institutions with explicitly non-
legal tasks. 
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The difficulty of course—a long-held obsession of administrative law21—
is that such reasoning tends to make a mockery of the very purpose of 
judicial review of administrative action, which is to ensure that executive 
actors remain within their constitutional mandates. In simple terms, if 
the legality of the ESCB’s action rests on a determination of the OMT 
programme’s effects, and only the ESCB is competent to assess those 
effects, judicial review of its action seems a formalistic and perhaps even 
pointless exercise. Examining manifest errors and evidence gathering, 
and requiring a statement of reasons, seems to do little to mitigate this 
concern. A powerful and well-tasked EU institution seems unlikely to be 
careless enough—when conducting a programme of the size and 
significance of the OMT programme—to commit the kind of egregious 
mistakes judicial checks of this nature could remedy. Similarly, one need 
not be a cynic to suppose that the ECB’s Governing Council consulted its 
legal service before issuing the press releases and other documents 
signalling the objectives of the OMT programme. By this reading, 
strategies of deference do not protect but rather upend the institutional 
balance by abrogating the role of the CJEU in ensuring that this balance is 
maintained (e.g. by checking substantively, and not merely procedurally, 
whether EU institutions have respected the limits of their powers).22 
The purpose of this analysis is not to criticize deference or the Gauweiler 
judgment, but rather to point to the trade-offs that deferential 
approaches to economic discretion pose. The uneasiness of these 
tensions may demand other strategies, including more extensive use of 
ex ante rule-making (a practice to which the next section now turns). 
4. Strategy 2: Prescription and Soft Law 
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The short analysis of Gauweiler discussed in the previous section makes 
the case seem much easier than it in fact was. The ESCB is not only bound 
by its formal Treaty mandate, but also by a plethora of other rules and 
standards.23 Such standards—in both hard and soft law forms—abound 
in economic governance and could be seen as a further means of limiting 
the discretion of the actors who apply them. 
A useful example is the one introduced in Section 2—the rules 
surrounding the EDP. Many of the vague standards referenced there, e.g. 
the definitions of a structural deficit or progress towards MBTOs—have 
been clarified by more detailed rules in delegated acts or soft law 
instruments. An example is the Commission’s publication in 2015 of a 
Communication clarifying some of the main rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP).24 As the Commission acknowledges, many of the 
SGP’s rules are unclear and hence carry the potential to create 
unpredictability and opacity.25 In this light, the Communication provides 
some key criteria determining the circumstances under which the 
Commission will enforce provisions of the SGP without, the Commission 
insists, ‘changing or replacing the existing rules’.26 
In respect to, for example, some of the vague provisions of the EDP 
discussed in Section 2, the Communication clarifies that significant 
structural investments or payments to European investment funds, such 
as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), will not ‘count’ 
                                                          
23 On soft law in banking and financial regulation, see, J Schemmel, ‘The 
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Legal Stud 455. 
24 Commission Communication, ‘Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
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towards assessing thresholds for the activation of sanctioning 
procedures.27 Equally, when measuring progress towards MTBOs, the 
Commission will take into account whether Member States have 
implemented recommendations made under the European Semester and 
will consider closing a deficit procedure early if any excess is due to 
structural reforms with likely positive budgetary effects.28 
The Communication is a form of ‘soft law’. It nevertheless could be seen 
as an example—pursued by the Commission itself—of placing what 
would otherwise be unfettered discretion within particular bounds. By 
defining or providing criteria for terms that are unclear in legislative acts, 
i.e. what constitutes a ‘one-off payment’ or a ‘major structural reform’29, 
guidance is given to the addressees of the SGP (i.e. the Member States) 
and to citizens on how particular rules will be applied. If the problem of 
discretion in economic governance is one of how to assess executive 
conduct ex post, a solution could in this sense be encouraging executive 
actors to produce more detailed rules of conduct to guide their action ex 
ante. 
Such rules or norms could be seen as ‘self-binding’ standards that could 
then be used to assess the limits of executive action by reviewing Courts. 
While the SGP Communication is a soft law instrument, some of its 
content could be seen as sufficiently precise to create legal obligations.30 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 5–7. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 See, e.g. the tests for this listed under page ten of the Communication: 
that structural reforms must be major, must have long-term budgetary 
effects and must be implemented (including via a submitted structural 
reform plan). 
30 On the judicial review of soft law in the EU more generally, see O 
Stefan, ‘Helping Loose Ends Meet: The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft 
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In recent case-law, the CJEU has significantly limited the ability of the EU 
institutions to avoid judicial review on the basis that obligations were laid 
out in non-binding policy instruments. In UK v ECB,31 on the Euro area 
clearing system, the UK had challenged before the General Court (GC) 
elements of an ECB policy framework, particularly rules that credit 
institutions holding certain product categories denominated in euros had 
to be incorporated in Euro area. Was this an annullable act? According to 
settled case-law, regardless of the form in which an act appears, ‘an 
action for annulment is available in the case of all measures adopted by 
the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to 
have legal effects.’32 As this act was published, used words of a 
mandatory nature, and carried specific content and a specific addressee, 
it was deemed an act of hard rather than soft law and hence was 
reviewable. By establishing a policy framework that was relied upon by 
those to whom it was addressed, the ECB had bound its own discretion 
(even if such a framework would not bind other EU institutions). Perhaps, 
in this way, soft law can be used to address the challenge of discretion by 
encouraging economic actors to create more detailed standards for 
themselves (i.e. standards that Courts could later patrol). 
There remain, however, profound difficulties with the use of prescription 
or soft law to meet the challenge of discretion in economic governance. 
Some of these challenges are simply new variants of long-held problems 
with regard to rationale attempts to codify legal standards. One of the 
core concerns of efforts to codify continental civil law in the nineteenth 
century was to rationalize disparate legal standards and place the 
political branch at the centre of legal reform.33 More detailed rules, 
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covering a wide range of circumstances, would better guide judges and 
administrators and avoid unwarranted discretion. 
The difficulty was the mismatch between the complexity of social 
relations and the goal of ‘simplicity’ in rule making.34 As technologies 
and social circumstances changed, drafters of legal codes had two 
options: either they had to create increasingly detailed rules to proscribe 
conduct—rules which began to conflict with each other, to grow, and 
ultimately to defeat the goals of rationale simplification; or, they were 
forced to couch rules in broad language and categories—duties of care or 
‘reasonableness’ that did little to meaningfully constrain administrative 
or judicial discretion. Either way, new pathways of discretion were 
revealed. 
While the current corpus of soft law in economic governance is limited, 
such a dilemma is not unimaginable in the economic governance case. To 
take the example given here, while the Euro clearing case provided some 
criteria regarding when a policy framework would tie the ECB’s hands, it 
remains unclear how these criteria could be transferred to other cases. 
To apply the CJEU’s criteria to the example of the Commission’s 
Communication on the SGP, this guidance is public and has a specific set 
of thresholds and addressees (Member States). However, the 
Commission also repeatedly states that it does not intend to ‘change or 
replace existing rules’ and that the guidance is tied to the political 
guidelines for the new Commission and hence part of policy making.35 
While the Communication narrows the Commission’s discretion, it is still 
likely to be overtaken by new events (e.g. changes in EU programmes 
such as the EFSI, or an altered economic landscape), requiring new 
guidelines to which the obligations are unlikely to be clear. As the body of 
soft law governing economic governance grows, so will grow the ability of 
economic decision makers bound by one rule to simply point to another 
                                                          
34 For an overview of some of these criticisms, see M Reimann, ‘The 
Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter and the Defeat of 
the New York Civil Code’ (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 1. 
35 On the latter, see SGP Communication (n 24) 3 
  
more favourable to their chosen decision. The growth of soft law is thus 
just as likely to create a morass of unclear obligations, unknowable to the 
ordinary public, as it is to lead to the precision and clarity which animated 
the original rationale stated in the Commission’s SGP Communication. 
Finally, one could wonder what kind of incentives a shift towards 
prescriptive rule making, particularly a form of rule making policed by the 
European Courts, will create. By judicially reviewing acts, such as the 
ECB’s policy framework or the SGP Communication, we may encourage 
institutions not to create such norms in the first place. In the case of the 
SGP Communication, the Commission had already been applying many of 
its provisions in practice in any case36; adopting a relatively flexible and 
hands-off approach to the corrective arm of the SGP in particular. By 
adopting the Communication, the Commission made transparent the 
norms guiding its activities; at the same time, by raising the spectre of 
judicial review of these norms, a future Commission may be reluctant to 
publicize such evaluative frameworks again, on the basis that policy 
documents could tie its hands in future activities. By using soft norms to 
limit discretion, transparency in policy making may, in fact, be reduced, 
encouraging the EU institutions to keep private and away from public 
view the detailed criteria guiding its decision making.37 Like strategies of 
deference, the use of prescription may also involve trade-offs between 
limiting discretion and encouraging open and transparent policy making. 
5. Strategy 3: Proceduralism and Political Accountability 
Section 3 analysed deference as a means of dealing with economic 
discretion. It described how forms of deference create a dilemma 
between, on the one hand, the need to respect the principle of 
institutional balance and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that 
                                                          
36 On the Commission’s lenient application of the SGP, see, D Adamski, 
‘Economic Policy Coordination as a Game Involving Economic Stability 
and National Sovereignty’ (2016) 22 ELJ 2. 
37 On potential trade-offs between transparency and judicial review in 
EU law, see D Adamski, ‘Access to Documents, Accountability and the 
Rule of Law: Do Private Watchdogs Matter?’ (2014) 20 ELJ 4. 
  
Treaty rules are properly fulfilled. One question is whether procedural 
requirements, particularly those guaranteeing greater political scrutiny 
and deliberation of economic decisions, could provide a way out, or a 
compromise position, regarding this dilemma. 
To sketch the compromise requires making a detour to other areas of EU 
policy. One of the key developments in EU policy making in 2015–16 was 
the announcement by the Commission of an extensive ‘better regulation’ 
package.38 While extensively watered down in the eventual inter-
institutional agreement on better law-making agreed between the three 
political institutions,39 the purpose of the agenda was to simplify the EU 
regulatory process and agree on a common method for forming, 
evaluating, and implementing EU proposals. A central tool in this regard 
has been the generalization of impact assessment (IA) as a means of 
measuring the costs and benefits of EU policy and its effects on different 
actors. For its proponents, IA is a means of rationalizing policy making, 
ensuring that EU policies are based on evidence and incorporate different 
viewpoints in the decision-making process.40 For sceptics, IA also carries 
a political purpose: while its emphasis on costs and benefits places an 
undue burden on social and environmental proposals with high 
implementing costs, IA could also be used as an instrument to make 
amendment of Commission proposals by the other EU institutions more 
difficult.41 
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EU Agenda’, COM (2015) 215. 
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40 On this academic debate over IA in the context of better regulation, 
see M Dawson, ‘Better Regulation and the Future of EU Regulatory Law 
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One of the more interesting aspects of the discussion over better 
regulation is whether IA could be used by the European Courts as a tool 
to control executive discretion and to ensure compliance requirements 
demanded by EU primary law.42 For example, one demand of the 
Commission’s package is that IAs provide a clear assessment of the legal 
basis for EU action, including an account of how requirements of 
subsidiarity and proportionality have been met.43 This requirement—as 
the inter-institutional agreement on Better Regulation states—extends to 
all ‘legislative and non-legislative initiatives, delegated acts and 
implementing measures which are expected to have significant 
economic, environment or social effects’.44 Other elements of the better 
regulation package are also of relevance in this regard: the Commission’s 
better regulation guidelines require a minimum 12-week stakeholder 
consultation period for EU measures, widening the scope of consultation 
requirements to include delegated and implementing acts.45 These 
elements of better regulation could be seen as significantly contributing 
to the ability of EU officials to meet constitutional requirements, such as 
the duty to give reasons protected under Art. 296 TFEU or the 
commitment under Art. 11 TEU to participatory democracy. 
Importantly for our question, better regulation also provides Courts with 
tools to assess whether constitutional requirements have been 
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42 See A Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When 
Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post Judicial Control’ (2011) 17 EPL 3. 
43 Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission, ‘Better 
Regulation Guidelines’ (SWD, 2015) 111: 29. 
44 Inter-institutional Agreement (no 39), 13. 
45 Ibid., 52. 
  
fulfilled.46 IAs have increasingly found their way into the CJEU’s case-
law.47 For example, in Vodafone the CJEU accepted that the Commission 
had demonstrated via its IA that variations in roaming charges 
constituted a meaningful barrier to the internal market and that 
harmonization of these charges constituted a proportionate measure 
without obvious alternatives.48 Similarly, in Afton, while the CJEU 
acknowledged that IAs were not binding on the Council or Parliament, 
they could act as an indicator of the evidence base used by the 
Commission when proposing legislative measures.49 The President of the 
Court himself has argued that IAs could form the basis of a ‘process-
oriented’ form of judicial review in which the European Courts do not 
‘second guess the intentions of the legislator’ but confine themselves to 
assessing whether basic procedural requirements of good governance 
have been met.50 In this sense, IA and better regulation could be part of 
an enhanced form of the strategies of deference discussed earlier: while 
the substantive decisions of policy makers should not be assessed 
judicially, the EU Courts should enlarge their review of the procedural 
and political steps decision makers undertake prior to adopting policy. 
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Law thus acts, under this model, as a guarantor of a rigorous and 
pluralistic decision-making process.51 
How could this apply to the economic governance example? A thin 
reading of procedural review in economic governance may simply be a 
beefed-up version of the existing requirement that decision makers give 
reasons for their decisions and base them on impartial evidence. The 
CJEU could require, for example, that actors such as the ECB demonstrate 
the necessity of their policies, or their link to the ECB’s Treaty-based 
mandate, through more than mere press releases and abstract reasons; 
rather, it could insist on more detailed forms of evidence, e.g. IAs (which 
would then be necessary to establish a presumption for more lenient 
forms of judicial review based on the notion of ‘manifest error’). A thicker 
reading would be the requirement for decisions to be based not only 
upon evidence, but also upon the integration, depending on the type of 
economic decision, of affected stakeholders. This radical departure could 
involve the development of an EU equivalent to the American interest 
representation model of administrative review, whereby Courts require 
decision makers to demonstrate the inclusion in policy making of either 
directly affected actors or public interest advocacy groups able to 
demonstrate a legitimate interest in decision making.52 Discretion is 
narrowed not by demanding responsiveness to substantive legal 
standards per se, but rather through demanding the inclusion in 
economic decision making of a wider range of affected actors. 
What would be lost if the ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ models of procedural review 
were adopted? Taking the thin model first, it potentially falls into exactly 
the same trap—of reducing judicial review to formal ‘box-ticking’—as 
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John-Hart Ely. See J-H Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University 
Press, 1980). 
52 See RB Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ 
(1975) 88 Harv L Rev 1711. 
  
strategies of deference. It is notable that the Commission itself, when 
providing guidance to policy officers on IA, explicitly points to the use of 
IA as a method to guard against judicial challenges to the validity of EU 
policy.53 IA, just as it could assist the judge in checking executive 
discretion, could also act as a shield against judicial scrutiny.54 The 
danger, unacknowledged in Lenaerts’ conception of process-orientated 
review, is that the mere presence of IA becomes an indicator that 
compliance with constitutional requirements has been fulfilled and 
thereby that judicial scrutiny of economic decisions, such as whether they 
carry a legal base or meet subsidiarity and proportionality requirements, 
is unnecessary (or can be conducted under a lower threshold of scrutiny). 
At the very least, the incorporation of IA into judicial review places 
greater pressure on the adequacy of the IA process itself. The better 
regulation package contains some measures to improve IA, e.g. creating a 
regulatory scrutiny board, staffed by external members, to review the IA 
process and veto poor-quality assessments.55 At the same time, the IA 
process carries plenty of critics, not least those who accuse it of carrying 
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a deregulatory bias,56 or of being easily ‘gamed’ by evidence constructed 
around a policy decision that has already been hierarchically agreed (and 
therefore is immutable to consultation or change via the IA process 
itself).57 These criticisms seem to suggest that, rather than rely on IA as a 
tool to limit discretion, the EU’s judiciary needs to play a role in 
scrutinizing, rather than deferring to, the IA process. 
The thicker version of procedural review faces challenges of its own. 
Some of these can be discerned from the US debate.58 While 
stakeholder and public interest inclusion can provide a new circle of 
actors to check and hold accountable administrative action, it is 
questionable whether courts carry the tools to properly police this 
process. One question, for example, is whether economic decision 
makers will include a fair balance of affected interests and whether those 
unfairly excluded can remedy their exclusion.59 Another is the balance of 
power, resources, and knowledge between civil society actors, which may 
narrow discretion but does so in favour of more privileged and resourced 
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participants.60 Finally, there is the always uncertain relation between 
participatory and representative models of democracy: what should 
economic decision makers, and judges checking administrative actors, do 
when duties towards civil society participants and towards general 
electoral processes (in the EU case, the views of the European 
Parliament, for example) conflict? 
Other challenges more specifically relate to the EU, and economic 
governance, case. The final problem—of a conflict between 
representative and participatory democracy—does not apply in the case 
of many aspects of economic governance, principally because economic 
decision makers may be intentionally insulated from both forms of 
democratic input. To take Gauweiler as an example, the ECB’s mandate 
provides, with good reason, a high level of political independence from 
other institutions, and from national political opinion. To what extent, 
therefore, should one expect or want actors in the banking field to be 
responsive to, or include, civil society input in their decision making? By 
providing the ECB with a fixed mandate via the Treaty, its writers 
seemingly excluded the responsiveness of that mandate to the 
accountability of interest groups (with ECB accountability restricted to 
formal dialogue mechanisms, with no sanctioning measures, such as the 
Monetary Dialogue undertaken between the ECB and the European 
Parliament).61 ‘Thick’ proceduralism simply sits uneasily with the very 
functions and design of the system of EU economic governance (or at 
least particular aspects of it). 
Procedural forms of judicial review and political accountability offer some 
mechanisms for judges to use political institutions as intermediaries in 
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narrowing economic discretion; at the same time, they carry the risk of 
doing too little or too much—either of retreating into formal box-ticking 
or conflicting with the very raison d’etre of the EU’s economic functions. 
A final alternative may be to look elsewhere—at the process via which 
economic decisions are justified and defended. 
6. Strategy 4: Interdisciplinary Justification 
To illustrate the fourth and final approach, it may be useful to again 
return to the Gauweiler decision. At the decision’s heart was the Court’s 
acceptance that the OMT programme was a necessary element of the 
ECB’s monetary transmission mechanism and therefore part and parcel 
of the ECB’s core monetary policy mandate. As those who have defended 
the decision have argued, how could the Court have done otherwise? To 
deny the centrality of the OMT to the transmission mechanism would 
have been to substitute the judgment of the Court for that of the ECB on 
a fundamentally economic question: one which lawyers are ill-equipped 
to judge. 
How well does this reasoning hold up? For all their limitations, judges 
rule on empirical and economic questions all the time. The EU’s judiciary 
is no different. In determining whether national regulation constitutes a 
barrier to the four freedoms, the EU Courts face no choice but to wade 
into questions of what constitutes a market barrier, and how such a 
barrier may be proportionality designed.62 In competition law, the Court 
must ask, when adjudicating Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty, whether 
certain agreements ‘distort’ the market or constitute an ‘abuse’ of a 
dominant position. In doing so, they are inevitably drawn into the domain 
of general economics. ‘The market’—essentially an economic concept—
may also be a central, if not the central, concept of substantive EU law.63 
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The behaviour of judges in domains like competition law may in this 
sense offer a guide as to how judges may seek to limit discretion in the 
field of economic governance. In competition law, too, the EU judiciary 
often limits its engagement with general economics. Tools to do this 
include the idea that certain practices or agreements necessarily distort 
competition regardless of their substantive effects on competitors.64 
Many cases, however, are not so easy. Given the immense power the 
Commission, in particular, wields in this field—as a first instance arbiter 
of competition infringements—the Courts require tools to check whether 
the Commission itself may be abusing its own position, or overstepping 
the mandate that Articles 101 and 102 provide. 
One of the tools the Courts use to police the Commission’s enforcement 
powers is to demand that the Commission justify its enforcement 
decisions. Decades of judicial prodding of the Commission to give 
transparent reasons for competition decisions has led the Commission to 
itself adopt standards to guide its decisions under Art. 101 and 102.65 
While these standards could be seen as akin to the soft law guiding the 
SGP mentioned in Section 4, they also incorporate standard economics 
into the process of competition review. This ‘more economic approach’ is 
particularly used to prioritize intervention. In its 2009 paper on priorities 
for the enforcement of competition infringements, the Commission 
promises to intervene to prohibit anticompetitive and exclusionary 
conduct only ‘where the conduct concerned has already been or is 
capable of hampering competition from competitors which are 
considered to be as efficient as the dominant under-taking.’66 Via the 
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‘as-efficient’ comparator approach, the Commission must utilize 
evidence, drawn from standard welfare economics that, absent the 
practice deemed illegal, an efficient competitor would be able to 
compete with the pricing or marketing strategy of the dominant market 
actor. 
Some scholars have considered whether such a test should also inform 
judicial review.67 Even if judges are not economists, mainstream 
economics can act as a means of guiding judicial review of Commission 
discretion. The Courts in this sense should check which impacts an 
anticompetitive practice surveyed by the Commission is likely to have on 
consumers, and assess whether tests like the ‘as-efficient comparator’ 
have been adequately fulfilled. Certain features of the EU Courts, such as 
the concentration of competition cases in the GC, could assist this 
function, encouraging the selection for competition cases of judges with 
familiarity with the essential requirements of competitive markets. By 
incorporating standard economics into judicial reasoning, the Courts 
could send a simple message: while the Commission carries discretion, 
that discretion is not unlimited, with substantive economic knowledge 
used as a baseline from which the Commission’s use of discretion can be 
assessed. 
The fourth strategy for dealing with economic discretion would involve 
generalizing the ‘more economic-based’ approach to the broader 
economic governance case. To return to Gauweiler, if the crux of the case 
is the ECB’s insistence that OMT is a necessary element of the monetary 
transmission mechanism rather than a tool of general economic policy, 
we require an EU judiciary that carries the disciplinary tools to verify that 
claim. This requires, for example, reasoning in the alternative—what 
would be the likely impact on the euro area, and on the ability of interest 
rate setting to affect prices, were an OMT scheme absent? The Court’s 
approach would move from one of deference to what Ronald Reagan 
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once dubbed, ‘trust but verify’, i.e. the assumption that other EU 
institutions act in good faith combined with the requirement that 
empirical claims are vigorously assessed and evidenced. 
Clearly, such an approach would require more than a change in judicial 
reasoning. It may require further tools or institutional reforms. One could 
be providing judges with heightened training in the economics of 
Monetary Union. Another could be permitting greater use of amicus 
curiae, i.e. briefings from high-level economists and think tanks (the 
Bruegels or Institutes for Fiscal Study of this world), providing up-to-date 
economic knowledge to scrutinize the empirical claims forming the basis 
of economic decisions.68 Finally, a more radical approach would be to 
make use of the possibility, envisaged under Art. 257 of the TFEU, to 
attach judges to a specialized tribunal of the Court. The rationale for such 
a tribunal would be to assess decisions under EU economic governance 
via judges with a narrower background and specialization in the law and 
economics of EU economic governance. Such an approach would have a 
single aim: to bridge the gap between the legal and economic worlds. By 
doing so, it would narrow the enormous discretion that this gap currently 
affords to actors such as the ECB. 
Clearly, such an approach would not be plain sailing. Even in the field of 
competition law, the ‘more economics-based’ approach faces plenty of 
criticisms, particularly as it applies to judicial review. One is that such an 
approach encourages a disinterested weighing of costs and benefits to 
consumers, undervaluing process-based elements of Treaty rules (e.g. in 
the competition field, the idea of equality of opportunity between 
competitors regardless of any ‘pro-competitive effects’ of actions by 
dominant undertakings).69 Similarly, in the economic governance field, 
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Treaty rules, such as the ‘no bail-out clause’ of Article 125 TFEU, may 
serve certain goals—like avoiding moral hazard—irrespective of their 
overall impact on the welfare of citizens. 
A further difficulty is that—by using mainstream economics to control 
discretion—we treat mainstream economics as natural and uncontested. 
The EU Courts could end up forcing the EU’s institutions to adopt a 
mainstream approach to economics even where evidence points to its 
failure in dealing with regulatory problems. One criticism of judgments 
like Gauweiler or Pringle is that it engages in too much mainstream 
economics, rather than too little.70 By elevating austerity and 
conditionality in these cases to the status of a constitutional principle, the 
Court legalizes an economic approach to Article 125 in particular that has 
caught Greece in a vicious spiral of stagnation and debt. 
If we accept that economics, like law, is a pluralist discipline, and that 
different economists may have different views on how something like the 
monetary transmission mechanism or the ‘no bail-out’ rule ought to be 
applied, we also might accept that the ECJ should not privilege one 
approach of economics over others.71 At the very least, a justification-
based approach based on mainstream economics would place the ECJ 
itself at the centre of a battle between economists (in a world where 
many EU citizens distrust the notion of economics as a neutral scientific 
discipline, able to objectively resolve particular social problems). By 
distancing judges from the task for which they are qualified—the 
‘objective’ application of rules—an approach based on economic 
justification could also distance the EU judiciary from two of the central 
planks of their legitimacy: their expertise in the law and their ability to 
apply that expertise impartially. Justification seems the most rigorous 
means of limiting economic discretion; at the same time, it seems the 
most radical and risky approach of all four approaches to tackling the 
adjudication of discretion in the EU economy. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented four alternative methods of limiting economic 
discretion. Certainly, there are tensions and trade-offs between them. At 
the same time, the European Courts are likely to mix and combine 
methods, and to do so differently in different areas of EU policy. To take 
the first approach—deference—as an example, a more deferential 
approach may be justified precisely in circumstances where the 
conditions present in other approaches have been met (e.g. where ex 
ante procedural or political requirements have been fulfilled). There 
seem good reasons to be less demanding of the ECB, for example, in 
circumstances where it is acting in an area of high complexity yet has 
consulted relevant actors and interests than in those where it explicitly 
contradicts its own established guidelines or has failed to justify and 
consider alternatives to its economic decisions. 
To conclude, it is worth reflecting precisely on the assumptions and 
values lying behind different approaches to controlling discretion. In the 
case of deference, we have already discussed its rationale, namely, to 
protect the values of institutional balance, and of a division between legal 
and policy-making bodies, established by the Treaty. In the case of the 
strategies of prescription and proceduralism, quite different rationales 
presents themselves (to which different actors may attach varying 
importance). Here an assumption may be that Courts should allow less 
discretion where economic decision makers are acting alone and are 
therefore more likely to make error-laden or biased decisions. Another 
assumption may be that Courts should be more active in policing 
economic authority where that authority strays into politically sensitive 
areas where bodies closer to the preferences of the general public should 
have greater input in decision making. More broadly, these strategies 
place a high value on inclusivity and principles of good governance within 
the political process, positing EU law as a mechanism to ensure that the 
  
policy process meets standards of democratic and political 
accountability.72 
Finally, the strategy of interdisciplinary justification, by grounding its 
review in welfare economics, places a stronger emphasis on the need for 
policy makers to make economically rational decisions. The value sought 
under this form of review is less inclusivity or respect for the Treaties 
than high-quality output, capable of objective justification. To this extent, 
while this chapter merely attempts to offer some ‘options’ for the control 
of economic discretion, choosing between these options requires a clear 
understanding of what kind of economic executive the EU is building and 
what kind of priority the EU should give to one rationale for judicial 
review over others.73 
Those who place a high value on institutional balance, for example, may 
posit executive actors in the economic field, such as the ECB, as 
authoritative and legitimate actors in their own right whose decisions 
carry an intrinsic legitimacy.74 Alternatively, those who place value on 
political inclusivity may see ECB action as authoritative only insofar as it 
can be tied to other forms of authority, provided via national 
governments, via electoral processes, or via the direct participation of 
those affected by its decisions. Alternatively, those who see the role of 
judges in policing discretion in terms of rationale outputs may be less 
open to using judicial review to tie economic decision makers to 
predefined ‘mandates’ and more open to seeing those mandates as 
incomplete tasks to be refined as the EU economy evolves and according 
to institutional judgment as to what the European economy requires to 
develop and thrive in the future. Each strategy is, in this sense, also tied 
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to an idea of what judicial review in EU law, and in the EU economy, 
should be trying to achieve. 
Developing a fuller theory of judicial review of economic discretion 
require something beyond the scope of this chapter—a theory of political 
authority and accountability in European economic governance, and an 
idea of why one rationale for judicial review ought to be chosen over 
another.75 The EU Courts need both better strategies, and better criteria 
for determining which strategy to choose. 
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